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Investment in Blood, by Frank Ledwidge
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In this follow-up to his much-praised book Losing Small Wars: British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan, Frank Ledwidge argues that Britain has paid a heavy cost – both financially and in human terms – for its involvement in the Afghanistan war. Ledwidge calculates the high price paid by British soldiers and their families, taxpayers in the United Kingdom, and, most importantly, Afghan citizens, highlighting the thousands of deaths and injuries, the enormous amount of money spent bolstering a corrupt Afghan government, and the long-term damage done to the British military’s international reputation. In this hard-hitting exposé, based on interviews, rigorous on-the-ground research, and official information obtained through the Freedom of Information Act, Ledwidge demonstrates the folly of Britain’s extended participation in an unwinnable war. Arguing that the only true beneficiaries of the conflict are development consultants, international arms dealers, and Afghan drug kingpins, he provides a powerful, eye-opening, and often heartbreaking account of military adventurism gone horribly wrong.
- Sales Rank: #2191854 in eBooks
- Published on: 2013-06-14
- Released on: 2013-06-01
- Format: Kindle eBook
Review
"'Investment in Blood is a damning account of the conflict.' (Terri Judd, The Independent.) 'Incredibly well researched, it is a short but depressing read... Definitely recommended reading, particularly for those seeking a single concise book that captures the essence of the Afghanistan conflict from a UK perspective.' (Army Rumour Service) 'This book is a masterpiece in miniature.' (Sherard Cowper-Coles, New Statesman) 'The book makes the case for a full inquiry into Britain's fourth Afghan war with economy and real punch. In itself it has made a pretty good start on the job.' (Robert Fox, Evening Standard)"
About the Author
Frank Ledwidge spent 15 years as a Naval reserve military intelligence officer, serving on front-line operations in the Balkan wars and Iraq, where he commanded British and multi-national units. In civilian life he practised as a criminal barrister for eight years before specialising in international development and human rights law, and worked as a civilian advisor all over the world, including in Afghanistan and most recently Libya. He is the author of Losing Small Wars: British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan (2011).
Most helpful customer reviews
4 of 4 people found the following review helpful.
Sobering Account Featuring Strong & Thoughtful Analysis
By Writing Historian
Frank Ledwidge follows his earlier book "Losing Small Wars" with an in-depth examination of British (and U.S.) involvement in Afghanistan. His apparent motivation is explained in the both the title and introduction, e.g. he is making it his own responsibility to provide the British people (and other interested parties) with information that the Ministry of Defense is unwilling or unable to provide on the cost of Britain's involvement in Afghanistan. That said, prospective buyers should not assume that the book deals solely with the pounds and pence spent on financing that conflict. Ledwidge does not ignore the human dimension - both Afghan and British - when assessing the cost. Nor does he limit himself to direct costs, as noted in chapter 3 where he explains how the cost of "collateral damage" - the euphemism for accidental civilian deaths - is a increasingly hostile Afghan population who turns against the British sent to "protect" them from the Taliban.
The book is organized with an introduction, Part I consisting of three chapters (respectively entitled 1.) Helmand and the "Angrez," 2.) Military Suffering, and 3.) Killing the Wrong People), Part II with three additional chapters (respectively entitled 4.) Military Costs, Financial Element of Death and Injury, and 5.) Developing Afghanistan), Part III with two chapters (respectively entitled 7.) And for What? - Afghanistan and 8.) And for What? Security), followed by a conclusion, notes, bibliography and index. The introduction is 12 pages in length, with most of the chapters run about 20 - 32 pages in length, ending with a 12 page conclusion. For those of you interested in the author's sources, they are found in the 6 page bibliography that includes articles, books, and internet sites. The book is well footnoted.
Note: "Angrez" is the afghan slang phrase for British. It originated during the Nineteenth Century when the British invaded twice. One of the greatest defeats suffered by the British Army took place in Helmand province at Maiwand in 1880. The Afghans had not forgotten the British invasions nor did they forget their defeat of the British in 1842 and 1880. In retrospect, it seems unwise to have sent someone considered as an invader to "protect" the Afghan people.
Ledwidge has been there and done that, meaning he has not written this book based solely on his analysis of first hand sources. He has been to Afghanistan and he has many, many friends and professional acquaintances who have also been there. He also understands both civilian and military sources, which allow him to weave both together to explain the topics that he is addressing. When a military source needs explaining, Ledwidge does so in clear and concise language.
I must admit to being convinced that the British Ministry of Defense is less open and possibly more byzantine than the U.S. Department of Defense. I do not know why for certain, but sense there is a somewhat adversarial relationship (understandable after reading about their C-17 acquisition program) between MoD and the British Treasury, which apparently has a much broader portfolio (and powers) than its American equivalent. Hence, you have the British Chief of Staff pushing for greater British participation in 2006 - when the British Army contingent in Iraq is drawing down - apparently in order to preserve a number of infantry battalions from being cut from the force structure in order to trim the defense budget. If you cannot see any linkage between a strategic goal and the desire to commit these troops in a different theater of war, don't worry, there doesn't seem to be much of a relationship. The ISAF move into Helmand, in retrospect, seems to have been the wrong move for it brought death and destruction (which Ledwidge highlights as part of the "Investment in Blood") to a quiet province where few Taliban were present and only three percent of the population live. The "success" gained by ISAF seemed somewhat counterproductive because coalition troops pushed the greatly reinforced Taliban out of Helmand into previously quiet provinces, where ISAF had NOT positioned forces in anticipation of the enemy redeploying out of Helmand.
One might think that because the author is British, his book isn't really tied into the "American experience" in Afghanistan. I would agree somewhat, but I would also point out that having a different perspective is often useful. For instance, I have not read in other books the observation that Ledwidge makes in reference to how the U.S. invasion of Iraq subsequently affected Afghan - U.S. relations. The Afghans at first welcomed U.S. troops as liberators, but after the Americans invaded Iraq, they began to see some sort of sinister plot by the U.S. to dominate the Muslim world. They became much more hostile toward their erstwhile liberators. Nonsense you say? Yes, perhaps, but their perceptions cannot be ignored - which apparently they have been by some American analysts. In short, the British (or other nationalities) may hear and see things about the United States in Afghanistan which Americans do not (or will not accept).
We have read a lot in the news recently about the Veterans Affairs Department, but I would suggest to readers that Ledwidge has pointed out far more systemic faults in the British treatment of their veterans, as well as the shortcomings of their National Health System when it comes to treating military casualties and Post-Traumatic Stress.
An eye-opening and thoughtfully argued account. It has changed my views on the eventual outcome of events in that embattled country. Recommended for those seeking a new twist on events in Afghanistan.
0 of 0 people found the following review helpful.
A enlightening, engrossing, enraging, saddening and depressing accounting for the true cost of Britain's war in Afghanistan.
By D. J. Goyne
Can one book be at the same time enlightening, engrossing, enraging, saddening and depressing? I think Frank Ledwidge manages this combination with ‘Investment In Blood’ his book accounting for, as his sub-title explains, ‘The True Cost of Britain’s Afghan War’. This book follows on from his devastating analysis of the British experience conducting counter-insurgency in Southern Iraq and Afghanistan in his earlier book ‘Losing Small Wars’. I think Mr Ledwidge can expect a frosty reception at future encounters with British politicians, generals and senior government officials, yet he is a patriot in the truest sense, unwilling to allow past mistakes to pass unacknowledged, as if not recognized they cannot be corrected.
He starts from the premise that when any government undertakes a war, it should firstly, know what it is trying to do, secondly have some workable idea of how it might do this, and thirdly, before embarking on a commitment of blood and treasure, weigh the likely gains against the costs expected. He finds that this was not the case with the British war in Afghanistan, and that optimistic expectations and naivety triumphed.
Using open sources, Mr Ledwidge totals up all the costs of the British commitment. He counts the human cost in lives ended and devastated for both the British forces and also for the Afghans in Helmand province amongst, and supposedly for, whom this war was fought. He then moves on to total up the direct financial cost of the British military commitment, the long term cost of caring for those physically and psychologically injured as a result of their service in Afghanistan, and the cost of development activities conducted by the British in Afghanistan. This last cost may appear counter-intuitive, but is legitimately billed as a cost of the war as the ostensible purpose of the British military commitment was to secure the space for their development program. This program was to be Britain’s contribution to the international efforts to build the government and social infrastructure for a new Afghan state strong enough to avoid being a failed state and haven for terrorists.
In his final section Mr Ledwidge tries to see if the gains in Afghanistan justified the cost. Sadly, he finds the costs far outweighed any transitory and limited gains. Many books with a similar approach can seem too clever by half, setting up straw men as easy targets and then showing how someone as clever as the author would never have made these obvious mistakes. Mr Ledwidge avoids this easy sneering as he is enough of an ‘insider’ participant to have experienced how mistakes are made and seen how even good efforts can fail and, yet, is enough of an outsider to be clear sighted and objective. In the absence of official figures, his open source figures cannot be authoritative, but I find them all too plausible and convincing.
I don’t think the author expects that every issue can be reduced to a ledger with clear costs and benefits totaled up to allow some definite ‘Net Present Value’ to be calculated, but he is surely right to think the costs of war are so high that the risks should only be undertaken when there is a clear, worthwhile and achievable objective commensurate with the likely costs. Sadly, too many cases for war fail this test. As a peripheral professional observer of our own (Australian) efforts in Afghanistan, I wonder how well we would stack up against a similar trenchant analysis.
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